I Do Enjoy Being Kind to Other Animals

I do enjoy being kind to animals, other than humans—and I don’t need a rational justification as to why that’s right for me. I respect them for what they are and interact with them on equal terms. I don’t believe it is right to subjugate them to my will, control them, or change them.

Yes, I do enjoy being kind to animals. It serves me well and fulfills my life with a sense of harmony. I can’t make anyone choose harmony or define it in a particular way, even though I can illustrate how bullying does not lead to stability. Therefore, I cannot argue with people who believe it is right to bully others (including non-human animals). Neither can I argue with people who find it acceptable to hurt others to achieve their goals because such means are objectionable to me. Nor can I discuss with people who deny or affirm a particular matter of fact to justify their moral conduct because my mind rejects invalid, unsound arguments.

Morality and science are two separate disciplines. I may not like the conclusions and implications of some scientific studies and may even find their application immoral; yet, my job as a scientist is to report my findings objectively. Stating a fact does not oblige me to adopt any particular moral stance. Science influences my perceptions but does not constrain how I feel about a fact. Ultimately, my ethical decision is independent of scientific fact.

G. E. Moore coined the term naturalistic fallacy in 1903 in “Principia Ethica.” In 1739, David Hume described, in “ a target=”_blank” href=”https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Treatise_of_Human_Nature” class=”editor-rtfLink” rel=”noopener”>A Treatise of Human Nature,” the ‘is-ought problem,’ also called ‘Hume’s Law’ or ‘Hume’s Guillotine.’ The ‘is-ought fallacy’ consists of deriving an ‘ought’ conclusion from an ‘is’ premise. We cannot deduct ‘ought’ from ‘is.

As an ethologist, I’m not concerned with what ought to be, only with what is. EchoingSatoshi Kanazawa, if I conclude something not supported by evidence, I commit a logical fallacy, which I must correct, and that’s my problem, but if my conclusion offends your beliefs, then that’s your problem.

With time, the rational principles that govern my mind and the ethical ones that regulate my conduct may or may not prove to be thefittest. Meanwhile, due to genetic pre-programming, social conditioning, and evolutionary biology, I enjoy being kind to animals. I respect them for what they are and interact with them on equal terms—and I don’t need a rational justification as to why that’s right for me.

References

Hume, D. (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature. John Noon, London, ISBN0-7607-7172-3
Moore, G.E. (1903). Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653614.003

(This article was first published April 13, 2014, and edited August 13, 2022) 

Featured image: I do enjoy being kind to other animals, respecting them for what they are and interacting with them on equal terms.